Diotima on virtue
Everything mortal in nature seeks that which helps them get as close as possible to living forever, obtaining immortality. And the sole way we can do this is through reproduction, as “reproduction goes on forever”. That is, at least, what Diotima states in her conversation with Socrates about the conceptions of Love. Diotima applies this reasoning to why mortals show a zeal for naturally valuing one’s own offspring, willing to do anything for them because it procures their own immortality. To explain this statement further, she uses the example of how humans would go to any lengths to achieve honour, referring to a few heroic characters to support her argument. Achilles would not have died after Patroclus, and Alcestis would not have died for Admetus. According to Diotima, rather than acting this way out of love or for the one they love, the only reason they behaved this way was because they expected their virtuous act – which people in ancient Greece still held in honour – to be remembered, leading them to attain glorious fame and thus rendering them immortal.
I have some reservations with this line of thinking. Let us start with the following question: Would someone who acts in a virtuous way, solely to achieve glory and remembrance of that virtue, still act in such a way if he believed his virtue not to become immortal? To state it in more general terms: would someone still act virtuously if he thinks the virtuous act will not be remembered? If we answer with respect to Diotima’s ideology, the answer would be pretty straightforward. One will not act in such a virtuous way, as it will not render them any closer to achieving immortality, for mortals value their own offspring – in this case, acts of remembrance – and would go to any lengths to preserve them. Even if the act is deemed virtuous, it will not be acted upon if it does not contribute to their own immortality. So, it means that one will act only in such a way that is in accordance with one’s pursuit of immortality, suggesting that these actions are solely driven by self-interest.
But could we not argue that an act is only truly virtuous if exerted by a virtuous character? To investigate this, let us first examine how a virtuous person would act. In my opinion, a virtuous person acts in such a way that his actions pertain to the idea that the reason for acting is not for an end that contributes solely to himself but for an end that results in the best outcome, which is the good end. By the good end, I mean that one acts solely for the sake of acting right or just or good, which is an end in itself and not for any other type of end. That is the object of a virtuous person, acting for the good end. Take, for example, the following. Suppose someone gives a homeless person sitting on the pavement some money with the intent of helping that person. In that case, he would be classified as a virtuous person, as he does not act selfless for a means other than helping the other person, which is acting good or right, which is the good end. Now imagine if someone were to be on a dinner date in a city. They have a lovely time and after dinner, the couple decides to go for a walk, where they eventually pass that same homeless person. One of them gives some money to the homeless person because they want to impress their date, hoping their date will perceive them as caring and selfless.
For the homeless person, the result is the same: he gets a little bit of money, appreciating the kindness of these people. Comparing these two scenarios showcases just how important intent is for the perception of action. Because are we not more inclined to think that the person in the first example is more honourable than the latter? This is because the person in the former intended to do the right thing, their objective being to act in accordance with the good end. In contrast, the latter was driven by self-interest, their objective being wanting to be perceived – or remembered – as honourable, which is not the good end. Would this then not mean that the act of the former is virtuous and good, for the person acts for the good end, whereas the latter can only be deemed as good but not virtuous, as their intent was not for the good end? So, a virtuous act can only be virtuous if the act is driven by someone acting solely for that good end, defined as a virtuous person. But an act that is good, for the result achieves the good end, is not always virtuous because a person performing it could have an intent that is not for that good end. So, an act is virtuous if performed by a character of virtue.
According to this, intention is what denotes a virtuous character from a non-virtuous character, and this is how we can distinguish a good and virtuous action from a good but not virtuous action by looking at the person performing it. So, following this, we can say that we honour good and virtuous acts, and one can only perform such an act if in possession of a virtuous character, meaning we also honour people of virtue. Now that we have defined how a virtuous person acts and grasped what defines an act as virtuous, we can move on to imposing these concepts on the ideology of Diotima about seeking honour. Let us look back at the examples Diotima uses to explain this. For now, based on the previous, we can clearly state that those supposed acts of virtue are actually not virtuous at all, which means that the acts are not honourable, and therefore, we should not honour them. This means that two things can happen. Either we forget their act of supposed virtue, for it is not honourable and should consequently not be honoured, meaning they will not be remembered and thus become mortal again. Or we remember them by the act which makes them unhonourable, meaning they are also seen in such a way. Whichever of the two happens, both of them share one commonality: their desire for immortality, once deemed as something good, has turned out to be a vice.