What would Al do? A reflection on virtue ethics

12 Mar, 2026

How we conduct ourselves must be guided in accordance with those characteristic traits we consider to be redeeming in such a way that we ascribe them to be virtues. The virtuous person, in their conduct, acts rightly, and possessing this quality can reach eudaimonia, or human flourishing. Aristotle states however that it is not simply acting right in itself that is sufficient for a person to be deemed virtuous as “moral virtue is chosen” and “virtuous acts themselves are the result of deliberation and choice, and the agents so deliberating are good deliberators – they possess practical wisdom that allows them to make the correct decisions about what they ought to do” (Driver, 2007, p. 143). Furthermore, the virtuous agent possesses a perceptual capacity for distinguishing which action is right, and it is “the person who is well trained, or who has been brought up well by her parents and received the right sort of education, will have developed this perceptual capacity” (Driver, 2007, p. 140). Alongside this, the virtuous person functions harmoniously, that is to say that the feelings of this person align with right action – they do not feel bad when acting right. An example to better understand what Aristotle’s view is can be found in Al and Barb. Al and Barb both act rightly, yet Al does so out of a good character predisposition, whereas Barb, with the right education and upbringing, consciously decides to perform the right action. Aristotle’s view would make it so that Barb would be truly virtuous, for she acts rightly and uses practical wisdom to achieve the answer to what is the right action, whereas Al acts right “accidentally” and without rational reasoning.¹

What I question on this view, though, is the usefulness of deliberation for the virtuous agent. A virtuous person is one who acts rightly — indeed, it is precisely the virtuous person who sets the standard for what right action is. Would it then not be outside of their character when they are presented with a moral dilemma to even think about actions that are not right? A person who has acquired ‘perceptual capacity’ must be virtuous, and as such, they can simply see what is right. Practical wisdom allows for the virtuous person to explain why their action is right, but it is not needed to know what is right; the perceptual capacity already accounts for that, and since this capacity is rooted in habituation rather than rational cultivation, the two need not depend on each other. So then, if the virtuous person simply knows right action, would only ever consider right action and would only act right, then deliberation and consequently also practical wisdom become unnecessary. How then can a virtuous person still deliberate? Consider precisely such a situation, where we have a virtuous person who is deliberating on a choice. We know that this deliberation does not concern which action is right, as the virtuous person has a capacity to perceive right action. What seems more sensible is that the virtuous person would have to deliberate not on what action is the right action, for they would not even consider the wrong course of action, but rather on what the rightest action is. While this seems to make sense, it still is not satisfactory, for how would we go about deciding what to do in a given situation if there are multiple right things that we can do? Practical wisdom would play almost no role here, as it merely allows us to explain why an action is right, but it offers no guidance on which of many right actions to choose. It could be stated, of course, that the capacity to perceive rightness would trump this concept, as one simply knows what is right, but that would be to undermine the appeal of virtue ethics in which multiple actions can be right. If acquired capacity is interpreted to lead to knowledge of what is right, it would mean that there would be only one given action that could be deemed as right. This poses a problem when we consider situations in which multiple virtuous agents all decide to do something differently. If each is equally virtuous and each perceives a different right action, there is no internal mechanism within virtue ethics to adjudicate between them. It seems then that something additional is needed other than a virtuous character to establish the rightest of actions.

Recall that Aristotle describes the virtuous person as being the person who functions harmoniously. If practical wisdom does not indicate which action is the rightest, would the virtuous agent then not have to listen to their intuition, as opposed to rational considerations or practical wisdom — since outside of practical wisdom, the only remaining internal guide would be their right feeling? When we look back at the example of Al and Barb, we concluded that, on Aristotle’s view, Barb would be deemed virtuous and Al would not. But if practical wisdom provides no true guidance in a situation where there are multiple right actions, perhaps a better guide for action would be to look at Al instead? Because is it not Al who unconsciously does good and thus would be able to distinguish better between multiple right actions? He would not deliberate; he would simply act based on his intuition and predisposed goodness. Sure, he has no practical wisdom and is not truly “virtuous”, but for the rightest action, it seems illogical to look at Aristotle’s virtuous person as an exemplar actor. While others have to think about goodness, Al simply is good. Becoming virtuous might be important, but its practical application is almost void when multiple right choices present themselves. Perhaps then, we should not focus too much on asking what the virtuous person would do, but rather ask ourselves: what would Al do?